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ABSTRACT

This Article critically examines the success of Title IX in eradicating sexual
harassment in educational settings after the Supreme Court decisions in Gebser v. Lago
and Monroe v. Davis. Regrettably, the high bar for recovery established by these cases,
in addition to poor administrative enforcement of Title IX have eroded its ability to
maintain discrimination-free schools. After an examination of the manner in which the
Canadian human rights model operates in the context of sexual harassment in educational
settings, recommendations are made that the United States should use the Canadian
example to improve its own system. Specifically, the United States should streamline and
simplify its administrative enforcement of Title IX and articulate clearer legal standards
for injunctive relief as opposed to recovery of compensatory damages.
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“For centuries, students were sexually harassed, but the law offered neither a label
nor a remedy”1 Even though the United States now has a legal remedy for sexual
harassment in schools, it has failed to deal adequately with the problem.2 This failure
“compromises students’ educational experience and legitimates sexual abuse. A society
truly committed to gender equality needs to lay better foundations among its youth.”3
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19724 with the noble
aim of eliminating sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal funding.5
Under Title IX, sexual harassment is considered discrimination on the basis of sex, and is
therefore also prohibited in education programs receiving federal funding.6
Unfortunately, the good intentions of Congress have not resulted in a reduction of
reported incidents of sexual harassment in educational programs in the United States.7
On the contrary, sexual harassment in schools is often tolerated or condoned.8
There are a myriad of reasons to account for the lackluster performance of Title
IX in the context of sexual harassment in schools. Notably, recent Title IX sexual
harassment jurisprudence has set legal standards for recovery of compensatory damages

1

Deborah Rhode, Sex in Schools: Who’s Minding the Adults?, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW 290 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
2
Id. at 291.
3
Id.
4
28 U.S.C. § 1681(a) et seq. (1972).
5
See generally Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
6
See 28 U.S.C. 1681(a); see also Gebser v. Lago, 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
7
American Association of University Women. Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing and Sexual
Harassment in School (2001), available at www.aauw.org/researchgirls_education/hostile.cfm/ (last visited
Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Hostile Hallways]. The 2001 study cited above was conducted by the American
Association for University Women and investigated sexual harassment in secondary schools in order to
compare the present situation with the results obtained from their initial study in 1993. Id. The
overwhelming conclusion of the study is that sexual harassment still exists at a high level in American
schools. Id.
8
See Rhode, supra note 1, at 290. Rhode argues that the challenge is to “increase the accountability
throughout the educational process.” Id.
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so high that plaintiffs are often deterred from initially filing cases.9 Not unpredictably, if
sexual harassment victims are not filing cases, effective redress of sexual harassment in
schools is consequently frustrated. In addition, when discussing the remedy provided to
victims of sexual harassment in schools, recent case law is focused almost exclusively on
compensatory damages, thereby undermining an opportunity to provide proactive
compliance enforcement, such as declaratory or injunctive relief, to schools that fail to
implement educational programs, policies, or grievance schemes to reduce hostile
environments in schools.10 Lastly, the administrative enforcement scheme of Title IX is
ineffectual and fails to provide any real teeth to the Congress’ statutory mandate of
discrimination-free educational environments.11
In Canada, on the other hand, sexual harassment is a violation of the dignity-and
equality-based human rights codes.12 Violations of these codes are tried under special
human rights tribunals, which are flexible adjudicatory bodies that have broad authority
to remedy violations and implement programs to aid in preventing future harm.13
The Canadian system is arguably better at effectively redressing human rights
violations as compared to the analogous system in United States. First, the Canadian
Human Rights administrative and judicial enforcement systems are streamlined to handle

9

See discussion infra Part II.C.3-4.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288, provided a legal standard for recovery of compensatory damages, but did not
address or clarify a legal standard for other equitable relief. This is somewhat ironic, considering that the
majority stated in Gebser that Title IX focuses more on protecting individuals from discriminatory
practices carried out by recipients of federal funds than on compensating victims of discrimination. Id. at
274. See also discussion infra Part II.C.
11
See generally American Association of University Women, License for Bias: Sex Discrimination,
Schools, and Title IX, Legal Advocacy Fund (2000) [hereinafter License for Bias].
12
See generally Chantal Richard, Surviving Student to Student Sexual Harassment: Legal Remedies and
Prevention Programmes, 16 DALHOUSIE L.J. 169 (1997), for a discussion of Canadian Human Rights
Legislation and its application to sexual harassment litigation.
13
Id. See also discussion of Canadian sexual harassment suits infra Part III.D.
10
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all human rights violations at both the provincial and federal levels.14 This streamlined
system arguably translates into more efficient and effective redress and prevention of
violations.15 Second, Canadian jurisprudence has repeatedly emphasized that the human
rights codes are to be interpreted broadly in order to most effectively carry out their
purpose of equal opportunity and freedom from discrimination.16 Third, the legal
standard of recovery for discrimination (including sexual harassment) in an educational
environment is clearly articulated, and is the same for both injunctive and compensatory
damages.17 This Canadian standard does not set the bar for plaintiffs nearly as high as the
compensatory damage standard in place in the United States.18
The United States should learn from the Canadian example. While it is not
possible for the United States to rewrite its civil rights laws to mirror those of Canada,
domestic courts should explore legal standards and avenues for relief that allow the
purpose of Title IX to be better effectuated.19 This purpose would be better served, for
instance, if the standard of recovery for injunctive relief was clearly articulated as a
negligence standard, as opposed to the higher standard currently in place for
compensatory damage relief.20 The United States should also learn from the streamlined
administrative enforcement of Human Rights Codes in Canada, and restructure and

14

See discussion infra Part III.C.
See generally Erika Chamberlain, A Classical Perspective on the Modern Workplace: The Aristotelian
Conflict in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3, 4 (2002).
16
See discussion infra Part III.B.
17
See discussion infra Part III.C.
18
Compare cases cited infra Parts II.C and III.C.
19
Interview with Jennifer Drobac, Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis (Feb. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter Drobac interview].
20
See discussion infra Part II.C.4.
15
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equalize civil rights enforcement agencies in the United States so that sexual harassment
in any context or setting is redressed with uniform effectiveness and authority.21
This Article will first define the problem of sexual harassment in schools. It will
then examine how sexual harassment litigation in both the United States and Canada has
evolved from each country’s respective civil and human rights laws. The Article will
further examine how each system goes about administratively and judicially addressing
complaints of sexual harassment in schools or other educational settings. Finally, a
comparison of the two systems will be made, and conclusions and recommendations
drawn from those findings.
II. THE UNITED STATES
A. Sexual Harassment in U.S. Schools
Regrettably, most girls and young women suffer some form of sexual harassment
while they are in school.22 In a study administered by the American Association of
University Women, a survey of more than 1600 high school students found that roughly
eighty percent had experienced some form of sexual harassment while in school.23
Eighty-five percent of the girls responded that they had been targets of harassment in
school.24 In addition, the vast majority of harassment reported was committed by other
students.25
While it is clear that many students report that they have suffered sexual
harassment in schools, it is not clear that all parties involved characterize the harassment

21

Drobac interview, supra note 19.
Hostile Hallways, supra note 7.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
22
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as problematic.26 Part of the sexual harassment problem in schools may be due to
reluctance among some teachers and parents to view peer or student-to-student sexual
harassment as a genuine problem; instead these parties argue that regulating “natural”
young male behavior somehow diminishes a young boy’s freedom to experience his
childhood.27
In order to make any headway in solving the sexual harassment problem in
schools, outdated attitudes, such as “boys will be boys” must be dispelled. 28 Sexual
harassment in any setting and at any age level is inappropriate and harmful to its
victims.29 The idea that this type of boys’ behavior is somehow natural and must be
tolerated is illogical in considering other behavior that is not tolerated.30 Pamela Price, a
pioneering attorney specializing in sexual harassment practice, stated as follows:
The concern appears to be that if we intercede in the developing sexual
identities of adolescents, or unduly interfere in their sexual behavior, we
will somehow warp their notions of sexuality. This concern is writ large in
discussions of the application of sexual harassment in education, but
appears completely muted when discussing issues of teen pregnancy, date
rape, and related problems, where the law interferes aggressively.31
Tolerance of sexually harassing behavior on the part of boys also teaches girls
that they are powerless to combat harassment, thereby contributing to the overall
26

Rhode, supra note 1, at 292.
Id.
28
See id. at 292-93. “A school should not excuse the harassment with an attitude of ‘that’s just emerging
adolescent sexuality’ or boys will be boys’…” Id. See also Pamela Price, Eradicating Sexual Harassment
in Education, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 60 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2004). Price offers her own personal history of sexual harassment she experienced while an
undergraduate at Yale, in addition to her thoughts on the development of sexual harassment law in the
United States. Id.
29
See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment: It’s Not Academic, available at http:
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list.ocr/docs/ocrshpam.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005). This pamphlet released
by Office for Civil Rights, a part of the U.S. Department of Education, serves as a policy guide for school
administrators in the United States. Id. The pamphlet begins by stating that “[s]exual harassment can
threaten a student’s physical or emotional well-being, influence how well a student does in school, and
make it difficult for a student to achieve his or her career goals.” Id.
30
Id. at 62.
31
Id.
27
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problem. 32 Deborah Rhode, a sexual harassment professor at Stanford, finds that
“[p]arents and teachers either say that girls ‘ask for it’ or that ‘it’s just a testosterone
thing,’ and girls should learn to ‘deal with it.’”33 Forcing girls to cope with harassment
may cause them to think that they are somehow responsible for the behavior, further
reinforcing gender subordination.34 Moreover, focus should particularly be placed on
combating sexual harassment behaviors against children and adolescents, as they are
more vulnerable to attack, and less likely to speak out about offenses because of their
lack of experience and maturity.35 As stated by Price, “[w]hat better place to teach our
children how to respect each other than in school?”36
In short, sexual harassment is a serious problem that has yet to be fixed in today’s
schools. Harmful ideas and attitudes that trivialize the harm sexual harassment causes to
students further thwart any efforts made toward solving the problem.37 Even so, the
United States has attempted to address the problem of sexual harassment in schools
through legislation and case law.38

32

Rhode, supra note 1, at 292. Rhode states that an assumption exists that “victims are responsible either for
provoking sexual abuse or for learning to cope with it.” Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Policy Statement – Sexual Harassment (Oct.
1992), at http://www.aacap.org/publications/policy/ps28.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006). The American
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry observed in a policy statement that “[i]t is common for
children and adolescents to conceal [sexual harassment] because they feel afraid, ashamed, vulnerable and
humiliated. They may actually believe their own behavior may have precipitated the sexual harassment.
These incidents are often not revealed for many years, if ever.” Id. Furthermore, even looked at from the
child nurturance/protectionist camp or the child self-determinist camp, laws should be enforced that prevent
sexual harassment in schools. Drobac interview, supra note 19. As self-determinists, children should be
able to assert their rights under civil rights legislation that safeguards them, or protects them from sexual
harassment. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982) for further
discussion of the differences between child protectionists and the self-determinists.
36
Id.
37
See generally Rhode, supra note 1.
38
See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
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B. The Development of Sexual Harassment Liability under Title IX
Before the United States attempted to tackle the problem of sexual harassment in
schools, it first addressed the broader issue of educationally-based gender discrimination.
In early 1970, female members of Congress began to push for legislation that would
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in educational environments.39 The now
famous Title IX was enacted shortly thereafter as part of the Educational Acts of 1972; it
provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ”40 Sexual
harassment in an educational environment is now considered discrimination on the basis
of sex, and is therefore considered a violation of Title IX.41
Sexual harassment was first recognized as discrimination on the basis of sex by a
federal district court in a 1976 Title VII employment case.42 Shortly thereafter, in 1978 a
federal court, relying on Title VII principles, found sexual harassment to be violative of
Title IX.43 However, at this time a private cause of action was not recognized and the

39

See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 (discussing the legislative history behind Title IX). The court
quoted Representative Patsy Mink as stating “Any college or university which has [a] . . . policy which
discriminates against women applicants . . . is free to do so under [Title IX] but such institutions should not
be asking the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination. Millions of women pay taxes
into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds should be used for the support of
institutions to which we are denied equal access.” Id.
40
28 U.S.C. 1681(a) et seq. (1972).
41
See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
42
See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.; Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
43
Alexander v. Yale, 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
It is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic achievement conditioned upon
submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education, just as
questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual demands from supervisors have
become increasingly recognized as potential violations of Title VII’s ban against sex
discrimination in employment.
Id. at 4.
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only remedy available was a termination of federal funds.44 Two years later, the United
States Supreme Court recognized a right to pursue a private cause of action for a
violation of Title IX.45
In 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court definitively held that sexual harassment was
indeed a violation of Title IX in the case of Franklin v. Gwinnett.46 In Franklin, the
victim was a high school student who alleged that a male teacher at her school “subjected
her to coercive intercourse,” in addition to other allegations.47 Ms. Franklin claimed that
the school knew about the abuse and did nothing to stop it.48 Instead, school officials
dissuaded her from pressing charges against the teacher.49 The Supreme Court applied
Title VII standards in Franklin, finding that “when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminates’ on the basis
of sex.”50 “We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and
abuses a student.”51 The Court also ruled that compensatory money damages were
available.52

44

See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd by 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
46
503 U.S. 60 (1992). “Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty
not to discriminate on the basis of sex . . . .” Id. at 75. Six years before Franklin, the Supreme Court ruled
in Meritor v. Vinson, 447 U.S. 57 (1986), that sexual harassment was discrimination on the basis of sex in
the employment context under Title VII. While Title VII and Title IX both encompass prohibitions on
sexual harassment, albeit it in different contexts, it is important to note that the case law for each statute has
had its own separate evolution, and each have their own separate legal standards. For a general comparison
of the two statutes and their differing sexual harassment legal standards, see C. Scott Williams, Schools,
Peer Sexual Harassment, Title IX, and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 51 BAYLOR L. REV.
1087 (1999); Justin P. Smith, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace after Faragher and Burlington Industries. 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1786 (1999).
47
Id. at 63.
48
Id. at 63-64.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 75
51
Id.
52
Id. at 76.
45
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While a brief history of Title IX case law is helpful in ascertaining the procedural
evolution of sexual harassment cases under that statute, the cases cited supra do not
present the present standard of liability under Title IX for sexual harassment cases. That
standard was established by the Supreme Court in 1998 in the case of Gebser v. Lago
Independent School District.53
C. Current Title IX Sexual Harassment Law
1. Gebser v. Lago
In Gebser v. Lago Independent School District, the Supreme Court set the current
legal standard for recovery under Title IX sexual harassment cases.54 Gebser, a highschool-aged girl, was involved in a long-term sexual relationship with a teacher,
Waldrop, over the course of her freshman and sophomore years.55 Waldrop initially made
sexually-related comments to the victim while she was in eighth grade and participated in
a book discussion club that he led at the local high school.56 During the next year,
Waldrop escalated his sexual contact with the victim until they were frequently engaging
in sexual intercourse during class time.57 The relationship ended when a police officer
discovered them having sex and arrested Waldrop.58
Gebser never reported the relationship to school officials, “testifying that while
she realized Waldrop’s conduct was improper, she was uncertain how to react and she
wanted to continue to have him as a teacher.”59 Parents of two other students did inform

53

524 U.S. 274 (1998).
524 U.S. 274 (1998).
55
Id. at 277-78.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
54
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the school principal of Waldrop’s sexually-related related comments in class.60 The
principal then held a meeting with Waldrop and the parents in which Waldrop was told to
be careful about the comments he made in the future.61 A guidance counselor was also
advised about Waldrop’s class comments. No other action was taken regarding Waldrop
until his employment was terminated following his arrest.62
Gebser and her mother filed suit against the school district and Waldrop under
Title IX and § 1983, in addition to other state law claims, seeking compensatory and
punitive damages from both defendants.63 The Title IX claim was dismissed against the
school district because the district court reasoned that “evidence was inadequate to raise a
genuine issue on whether the school district had actual or constructive notice that
Waldrop was involved in a sexual relationship with a student.”64 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed on similar grounds.65
The Gebser Court affirmed the lower court decision in finding that in order to
recover for sexual harassment suffered in school, the victim must show that a person in a
position of authority with the ability to take corrective action had actual knowledge of the
discrimination and was recklessly indifferent to that discrimination.66 By far the highest
hurdle to overcome under the Gebser standard is establishing that the person in the
position of authority had actual knowledge or notice of the discrimination.67

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 278-79.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 280.
66
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added).
67
For instance, under the Title VII workplace cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998), and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), employers are held to strictly liable or
negligence standards for actions of sexual harassment committed by their employees. See Smith, supra note
46. School administrators, on the other hand, have to actually know about actions of sexual harassment
61
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The majority opinion gave a detailed account of the legislative history and
congressional intent behind Title IX, upon which Justice O’Connor relied heavily in
framing her opinion regarding the notice standard.68 O’Connor, writing for a five-to-four
majority, stated that Congress had “two principle objectives in mind: ‘[t]o avoid the use
of federal resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ‘to provide individual
citizens effective protection against those practices.’”69 The Court noted that the statute
was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race
discrimination in all programs receiving federal funding.70 The two statutes operate in
essentially the same manner, conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise by the
recipient not to discriminate.71 In effect, the majority found that the statutes operate as a
contract between the government and the recipient of funding.72
Justice O’Connor then distinguished Title VII from Title IX, finding that Title VII
is framed in terms of “outright prohibition” not “condition.” 73 She continued, stating that
Title VII applies to all employers without regard to federal funding and
aims broadly to ‘eradicat[e] discrimination throughout the economy.’ Title
VII, moreover, seeks to make persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination. Thus, whereas Title VII aims centrally to compensate
victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on ‘protecting’
individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of
federal funds.74

committed by school employees for liability to attach under Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. A possible reason for
the differing standards might be that private companies and school districts are two fundamentally different
types of financial organizations to hold liable. Drobac interview, supra note 19.
68
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286.
69
Id.
70
Id; see also 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq (1964). Title VI provides in pertinent part: “No person in the United
States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activities receiving Federal financial
assistance.” Id.
71
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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O’Connor used these differences in the legislative history, Congressional intent, and
statutory framework between Title VII and Title IX to establish the legal standard for
recovery for sexual harassment under Title IX, in particular the amount of notice required
on the part of schools officials to trigger liability.75
O’Connor argued that Congress did not intend for constructive notice to trigger
liability under Title IX because of the statute’s contractual framework.76 O’Connor
essentially found that it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend for liability
to attach in monetary damages for the noncompliance with a condition.77 Furthermore,
she found that the statute’s construction of allowing agency enforcement also does not
envision liability under constructive notice or respondeat superior when the agency
cannot initiate enforcement proceedings until it has given notice to recipients of funding
that they are not in compliance.78 Thus, under this analysis, Justice O’Connor, in order to
avoid “frustrating the purposes” of Title IX, distinguished the notice standard for
recovery under Title IX from that under Title VII, where violations are either categorized
under a strict liability or negligence standard, based upon the status of the harasser.79
Justice Stevens, however, writing for the dissent, found that the majority’s
opinion is not faithful to the class of people Title IX intended to protect.80 In particular,
Stevens noted that the majority veered from settled principles of agency in distinguishing
between recovery under Title VII and Title IX.81 Stevens observed this differentiation
negatively, finding that any slight difference in the statutory language is due to the
75

Id.
Id. at 287.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 288.
79
See supra note 67. Again, different notice standards have been established by the courts for harassment
that occurs in the workplace as opposed to a school or other educational environment. Id.
80
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306.
81
Id. at 306 n. 9.
76
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difference between a workplace and a school, not in a Congressional intent to afford less
protection to victims under Title IX.82 Stevens further found that the majority, in
mistakenly focusing on the statute’s framework and administrative enforcement scheme,
is “[a]s a matter of policy . . . rank[ing] the protection of the school district’s purse above
the protection of immature high school students that [Title IX’s] rules would provide.”83
In short, the dissent concluded that “few Title IX plaintiffs who have been victims of
intentional discrimination will be able to recover damages under this exceedingly high
standard.”84
Thus, as stated, under Gebser, the majority Court held that “a damages remedy
will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address
the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf
has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs and fails adequately to
respond.”85 The Court offered guidance in interpreting the “fails to respond” or “reckless
indifference” portion of the standard by likening it to the deliberate indifference standard
under § 1983 claims.86 The Court did not, however, elaborate appreciably on what
constitutes actual knowledge of discrimination.87 At present, lower court decisions are

82

Id.
Id. at 306.
84
Id. at 304.
85
Id. at 290.
86
Id. Under § 1983 claims, “deliberate indifference” essentially “requires proof of a clearly apparent need
for action and a woefully inadequate response, such that one can reasonably assume that the decision
makers were deliberately indifferent to the need.” Williams, supra note 46, at 1103. See City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), for the Court’s development of the deliberate indifference standard for § 1983
cases. In Doe v. University of Illinois Judge Posner expounded on the meaning of deliberate indifference in
the Title IX context, stating that in a situation in which the “school knows about the harassment, knows that
it is serious or even dangerous, and could take effective measures at low cost to avert the danger, but
decides, consciously and deliberately, to do nothing, although it does not base this decision on an invidious
ground such as race or sex.” 138 F.3d 653, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
87
Perhaps because it was evident that petitioners in this case conceded that they could not recover under an
actual notice standard, the Court did not find it necessary to further define what would specifically
constitute actual notice. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291.
83
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offering different answers to that question.88 Some districts have established a strict
construction of the actual notice standard under Gebser that finds that a “substantial risk”
of abuse does not constitute notice.89 Other districts have found that direct complaints by
third parties or numerous rumors are enough to generate notice.90 Lastly, who constitutes
an “appropriate person” that can end the discrimination, is generally determined to be, if
not at least a principal, then a school board member or school superintendent.91
2. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
The legal standard for recovery for sexual harassment under Title IX was
reiterated in the Supreme Court case of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,92
decided one year after Gebser.93 Perhaps more importantly, Davis established that under
Gebser a victim of peer, or student-on-student, sexual harassment at school may bring an
action under Title IX.94
In Davis, a young girl in the fifth grade was allegedly the victim of a prolonged
pattern of harassment by one of her fifth grade classmates.95 According to the victim’s
mother, the harasser’s conduct included attempts to touch LaShonda’s breasts and genital
area and vulgar statements such as “I want to get in bed with you” and “I want to feel

88
See Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004); Bayard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 237 (4th Cir.
2001); P.H. v. The Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 663 (8th Cir. 2001); but see Johnson v. Galen
Health Insitutes, Inc., 267 F.Supp. 2d 679, 688 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Hart v. Paint Valley School Dist., No. C201-004, 2002 WL 31951264 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2002); Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp.
2d 57, 63 (D. Me. 1999).
89
See, e.g., Bayard, 268 F.3d at 237-38.
90
See, e.g., Doe, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (finding that actual notice “requires more that a simple report of
inappropriate conduct” on the part of a school employee but “the … standard does not set the bar so high
that a school district is not put on notice until it receives a clearly credible report from the plaintiffstudent.”). See also Johnson, 267 F.Supp. 2d 679, 688; Hart, No. C2-01-004, 2002 WL 31951264.
91
See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
92
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
93
524 U.S. 274 (1998).
94
Id. at 633.
95
Id.
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your boobs.”96 The harasser also allegedly touched LaShonda in a suggestive manner in
the hallway, and directed sexually harassing behavior towards her several times while
they were together in gym class.97 Each of the incidents was reported to the girl’s teacher,
who assured the mother that the principal of the school was also notified.98 According to
the mother, her daughter’s once high grades fell as a result of the harassment; the victim’s
father also discovered that she had written a suicide note during the period that his
daughter was being harassed.99
The petitioner brought suit against the Monroe County Board of Education
seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief under Title IX after no disciplinary
action was taken against the harasser.100 At both the district court and appellate court
levels the case was dismissed on the ground that peer, or student-on-student, sexual
harassment provides no ground for a private cause of action under Title IX.101
Justice O’Connor, again writing for the majority of the Court, found that an action
for peer sexual harassment may be brought under Title IX, but “only for harassment that
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s
access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”102 O’Connor found that the harassment
suffered by the daughter was actionable, even though it was not committed by a school
official, because it created an environment that denied her equal access to education
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opportunities, as shown by the victim’s decreasing grades, and was not remedied by
school officials that knew about the harm.103
The decision in Davis was also five-to-four majority, with Justice Kennedy (who
was part of the majority in Gebser) writing the dissent.104 Kennedy attacked O’Connor’s
opinion on several fronts.105 Notably, Kennedy found that much needed funding for
schools will be diverted into compensatory damage payments to victims of peer sexual
harassment under Title IX, thus resulting in schools implementing a federally mandated
code of conduct, contrary to the principles of federalism.106 But perhaps more
shockingly, Kennedy further suggested that behavior actionable by the majority under
Davis is perhaps difficult to even define as sexual harassment.107 Kennedy stated that
“[n]o one contests that much of this ‘dizzying array of immature or uncontrollable
behaviors by students,’ is inappropriate, even ‘objectionably offensive’ at times . . . It is a
far different question, however, whether it is either proper or useful to label this
immature, childish behavior gender discrimination.”108 In essence, the dissent found that
Davis will result in a floodgate of student-on-student sexual harassment litigation, and a
school’s only choice in dealing with that outcome would be to implement codes of
conduct that have no chance in altering normal, immature, childish behaviors, that have
been wrongfully characterized as “sexual harassment.”109
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O’Connor rebutted much of Kennedy’s criticism by emphasizing that liability can
only attach for unreasonable indifference to harassment in light of the known
circumstances.110 She also pointed out that schools, and school officials, by their very
nature have some authority over the behavior of children in their programs.111 O’Connor
writes: “the nature of [the State’s] power [over public schoolchildren] is custodial and
tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over
free adults.”112
While the dissent in Gebser initially presented many of the criticisms of the
Court’s interpretation of Title IX, many legal observers and scholars went on to further
suggest that the Court’s opinions in both Gebser and Davis do little to protect students
from sexual harassment, particularly from their peers.113 Furthermore, even as Kennedy
argued that the majority’s opinion in Davis will open the floodgates of litigation; the
converse result appears more likely as the strenuous legal standards for recovery under
Title IX for sexual harassment present a high barrier for recovery to potential plaintiffs.114
3. Criticism of the Law in the United States:
The bottom-line criticism of the Title IX sexual harassment standard under
Gebser is that it is crafted in such as way as to fail to both effectively remedy past harm
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and prevent future harm.115 Sexual harassment professor Deborah Rhode found that the
Gebser decision was simply a “step in the wrong direction.”116 Rhode noted that under
the employment cases of Faragher117 and Burlington Industries,118 an employer can be
held liable for a supervisor’s conduct, even if the employer did not have direct knowledge
of the conduct in question.119 Under Gebser, however, she found that adult school
employees, such as teachers and janitors, have more protection from sexual harassment
than students have.120
Rhode also noted that the decision in Gebser not only fails to promote adequate
harassment policies, it actually encourages schools to turn a blind eye to harassment.121
As Rhode states, “[w]hen ignorance is bliss, and a defense to legal judgments, why
should schools establish effective complaint strategies? The less the school knows, the
less its risk of liability.” 122 While Rhode acknowledged that O’Connor did not wish to
press the decision any further because of the agency enforcement scheme of Title IX,
Rhode observed that ignorance as a legal strategy could hardly have been the outcome
desired by the Gebser majority.123
In discussing Davis, Rhode found that at least the Supreme Court did better than
some lower court decisions that denied that individual recovery was even allowed under
Title IX for peer sexual harassment.124 Like Gebser, however, Davis still creates
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incentives for school districts to avoid knowledge of sexual harassment that might subject
them to liability under Title IX.125 Rhode further noted that the current system is made
even more problematic by relying on students to come forward to administrators about
sexual harassment they may have suffered.126 Students are far too reluctant to readily
complain to anyone about something so sensitive, especially something that could lead to
embarrassment and humiliation by other students.127 Lower court rulings have
compounded this difficulty by requiring students to give notice to a school board member
or a senior supervisor with authority to ensure Title IX compliance, instead of a teacher
with whom they may be more comfortable and open.128 Rhode concluded by advocating
a system more like that found in employment law, and also advocated by Justice
Ginsburg in her dissent in Gebser, where school administrators and officials could be
held liable under Title IX, even if they lack specific knowledge, unless the school had an
effective grievance policy in place to report and redress sexual harassment complaints.129
Pamela Price found similar problems with Title IX sexual harassment
jurisprudence.130 Price summed up her experience as follows:
What I have found in my law practice and in …teaching is that many
school districts still don’t have Title IX officers, don’t have grievance
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procedures, and some don’t even know what Title IX is. With so little
knowledge, and no experience in enforcing the law, it is still 1977 in most
parts of America.131
4. Where are all the cases?
The negative treatment of the Gebser standard by legal scholars in its ability to
exact change in the system is further supported by the dearth of Title IX sexual
harassment suits, settlements or verdicts, post-Gebser.132 Anecdotally, a plaintiff’s
attorney who won a rare verdict for a student sexual harassment victim was quoted in the
Detroit Free News as stating, “Most of the cases never make it to the jury because of the
deliberate indifference standard . . . You have to show . . . the district should have known
the students’ rights are being violated and they did nothing or had a policy of doing
nothing.”133 Moreover, a LexisNexis search revealed only sixty three Title IX sexual
harassment cases after June 22, 1998, the date Gebser was decided.134 Of those cases,
thirty-five were disposed of on either summary judgment or dismissal in favor of the
defendant(s).135 Seventeen of those dismissals or summary judgments were based on a
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lack of actual notice under Gebser.136 The majority of the other dismissals were based on
either a failure to meet the Davis peer sexual harassment hostile environment standard
(nine) or a failure to meet the deliberate indifference standard (seven).137 Two verdicts for
the defense were upheld on appeal138 while only one verdict for the plaintiffs was
affirmed.139 Conversely, an analogous search for Title VII hostile work environment
sexual harassment cases within the same time period yielded 1597 results.140
Another reason plaintiffs may fail to bring cases is the ambiguous legal standard
for equitable relief versus damages under Title IX in sexual harassment cases.141 When
the Court established the actual notice standard for Gebser, it only referred to
compensatory damages in crafting its standard.142 However, the Court never delineated
whether the actual notice standard applied to equitable relief as well as compensatory
damages.143 Thus, even now, though equitable relief is available under Title IX, it has not
firmly been established whether the legal standard for such relief is actual notice, or some
lower standard.144 The situation is made more unclear by the assertion of the Office of
Civil Rights (OCR), the administrative body charged with implementing and enforcing
Title IX, that:
While recognizing the requirement of actual notice for private actions
seeking money damages, OCR continues to assert that for regulatory
136
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purposes and for private actions for injunctive and other equitable relief, a
school has notice if a responsible employee knew, or in the exercise of
care should have known of the harassment.145
Thus, even if a plaintiff were only seeking injunctive relief, such as implementation of a
sexual harassment policy or training and grievance procedures, the ambiguity created by
Gebser, and the subsequent failure of the Supreme Court to clarify its standard in relation
to the OCR could effectively deter a plaintiff from bringing a case at all.146
Thus, while a (rare) verdict can make an individual plaintiff whole, the present
system does little to effectuate the purposes of Title IX.147 Because plaintiffs are deterred
from bringing any sort of suit, in damages or for equitable relief, schools districts are not
consequently compelled to be compliant with Title IX policies.148 Furthermore, the
Court’s high standard for damages recovery in Gebser suggests a concern on the part of
the court that high damage awards could strip precious funds from school districts’ other
needy students.149 Therefore, as more focus shifts to preventing financial loss on the part
of school districts, less focus is invested in the most efficient manner of implementing
prevention strategies and stopping harassment.150
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D. Administrative Enforcement of Title IX in the United States
The United States Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is
charged with the responsibility of Title IX administration and enforcement.151 The OCR
informs school districts of their obligation under Title IX to: have a sexual harassment
policy, inform students and staff of that policy, and have published grievance procedures
in the event that the policy is violated.152 The OCR’s publication, The Guidance, gives
examples of what constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment
sexual harassment.153 The OCR also released a pamphlet entitled Sexual Harassment: It’s
not Academic, which explains schools’ obligations under Title IX in a format easier for
students, parents and teachers to understand.154 The pamphlet does refute the notion that
“boys will be boys,” stating:
A school should not excuse the harassment with an attitude of ‘that’s just
emerging adolescent sexuality’ or ‘boys will be boys,’ or ignore it for fear
of damaging a professor’s reputation. This does nothing to stop the sexual
harassment and can even send a message that such conduct is accepted or
tolerated by the school. When a school makes it clear that sexual
harassment will not be tolerated, trains it staff, and appropriately responds
when harassment occurs, students will see the school as a safe place where
everyone can learn.155
The pamphlet also notes that sexual harassment prevention is important at all educational
levels.156
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The OCR’s website provides information about how to file a complaint: the
complaint must be made in writing (online is acceptable), contain a description of the
charges, and be filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.157 The OCR will then
investigate properly filed complaints; complaints that contain sufficient evidence of
noncompliance will generally result in an agreement of compliance between the OCR and
the school.158 If a school fails to come into compliance after an agreement was made with
the OCR, and future agreements are also to no avail, the agency may proceed with
administrative enforcement procedures.159 These include either termination of funding or
referral to the department of justice for judicial enforcement.160
In the OCR’s yearly Report to Congress, it publishes a limited number of
statistics, including the number of complaints, or “receipts,” the agency received during
that year.161 The 2004 Report noted that the agency received 283 sex-based complaints,
of which sexual harassment is included, which accounted for six percent of the total
complaints received.162 The vast majority of complaints, fifty-two percent, were
disability-based.163 These numbers suggest a vast disparity in the reported amount of
harassment occurring in schools and the amount of harassment complaints received.
While it is true that reported incidents of harassment could be resolved by school or state
agencies, thus negating the need for OCR regulation, at least one study suggests that the
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OCR is doing a poor job of rooting out harassment in schools.164 The study notes that the
OCR’s statute of limitations on complaints is six months; a much shorter time than
complainants have when filing in state or district court.165 Moreover, lack of knowledge
of Title IX or OCR regulations is not grounds for an extension in filing time.166 Second,
while the OCR has power to refer cases to the Department of Justice for judicial
enforcement, a Title IX case has never been referred.167 Poor enforcement by the OCR is
particularly tragic because the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of
administrative remedies to allow a school to come into compliance before it will impose a
last-resort remedy like fund termination.168
Unlike the OCR, the Equal Opportunity in Employment Commission (EEOC), the
administrative body that is charged with enforcing Title VII in the workplace,169 seems to
enjoy relative success compared to the OCR in achieving its goals.170 While the OCR has
only referred two cases to the Department of Justice for judicial enforcement, the EEOC
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has the power to file suit, and in 2004 filed 280 Title VII suits in court.171 Perhaps this
disparity is due to the relative priorities of the political parties in office, or simply the
greater perceived importance of eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace.172
Because sexual harassment case law has effectively neutralized the promise of
Title IX, “the victims whom it was intended to protect are being victimized a second time
by the judicial system.”173 Likewise, the poor performance of the OCR in actually
enforcing and implementing Title IX in U.S. schools has further eroded the promise of
discrimination-free learning environments.174 For these reasons, the United States should
look to the Canadian model of civil rights legislation and enforcement for ideas about
how to improve domestic judicial and administrative enforcement of Title IX.
III. CANADA
A. The Problem in Canada
Culturally speaking, Canada is very similar to the United States, and, not
surprisingly, also suffers from a high rate of sexual harassment in its schools.175 For
example, in a study conducted in Ontario secondary schools, a reported eighty percent of
female students had been sexually harassed.176 However, Canada’s system of human

171

See EEOC, EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 through FY 2004, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ litigation.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
172
This disparity seems embodied in the simple fact that almost everyone has heard of the EEOC, and
almost no one has heard of the OCR. Drobac Interview, supra note 19. The relative ease in locating the
EEOC website probably also helps it more easily disseminate information: it is located at simply
www.eeoc.gov. In order to find the OCR website, one must wade through three Department of Education
webpages. See www.ed.gov. Even if one finds the OCR website, its format is much more difficult to read
and navigate than the format found at the EEOC site. See www.eeoc.gov and
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html.
173
Price, supra note 28, at 63.
174
See License for Bias, supra note 11.
175
Toronto, Ontario Secondary School Teacher’s Federation, The Joke’s Over – Student to Student Sexual
Harassment in Secondary Schools (1995) at 3.
176
Id.

28

rights legislation for resolving anti-discrimination violations, such as sexual harassment,
operates differently than the civil rights legislation system in place in the United States.177
B. The Operation of Human Rights Legislation in Canada
In Canada, sexual harassment is considered discrimination on the basis of sex
under human rights legislation passed by the Canadian parliament in 1977.178 The
resulting Canadian Human Rights Act (HRA) has as its purpose: “that people should not
be placed at a disadvantage simply because of their age, sex, race, or any other ground
covered by the Act.”179 The legislation was passed “to ensure equality of opportunity and
freedom from discrimination in federal jurisdiction.”180
Canadian human rights legislation functions differently than civil rights
legislation in the United States. For example, in the Unites States, a workplace sexual
harassment claim, whether it arises in the public (local, state or federal) or private sector,
may be brought under the federal Title VII cause of action.181 In Canada, however,
human rights legislation operates at both the federal and provincial level; each having
separate jurisdiction over the cases that arise therefrom.182 The Canadian HRA only
applies to individuals working for either the Federal Government or a private company
regulated by the Federal Government.183 It also applies to anyone who receives goods and
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services from any of those sectors.184 Similarly, each province has its own human rights
law, usually called a Code or an Act (or in Quebec, a Charter), that covers other types of
organizations not included under federal legislation.185 For instance, schools, retail stores,
restaurants, and most factories are covered by provincial human rights law, as are
provincial governments themselves.186
Unlike the broadly differing views in the United States regarding the proper
Congressional intent and interpretation of American civil rights legislation,187 Canadian
judicial decisions have firmly established a broad interpretation of human rights
legislation.188 The reasoning behind this broad application may lie in the constitutional or
quasi constitutional nature of the legislation; for example, in the case of Ontario Human
Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd.,189 Justice McIntyre of the
Canadian Supreme Court stated:
It is not, in my view, a sound approach to say that according to
established rules of construction no broader meaning can be given to the
Code that the narrowest interpretation of the words employed. The
accepted rules of construction are flexible enough to enable the Court to
recognize in the construction of a human rights code the special nature and
purposes of the enactment, . . . and to give it an interpretation which will
advance it’s broad purposes. Legislation of this type is of a special nature,
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not quite constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary – and it is for
the courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect.190
C. Canadian Administrative and Judicial Enforcement of Human Rights Legislation:
When federal and provincial Canadian human rights legislation was created,
special administrative commissions were also created at both the federal and provincials
levels to administer and enforce the Acts.191 These human rights commissions bridge the
gap between constitutional human rights theory192 and application by establishing
practical steps and legal channels for solving human rights violations.193 The Canadian
Human Rights Commission (HRC) administers the federal HRA.194 The HRC is the
Canadian equivalent of the various federal United States’ civil rights agencies, such as
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Office of Civil Rights.195 Each
province also has its own corresponding commission to administer that province’s human
rights code.196 As stated by the federal Canadian HRC:
The Commission administers the Canadian HRA…and ensures that the
principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination are followed in all
areas of federal jurisdiction. This includes…helping parties to resolve
complaints of discrimination in employment, investigating complaints of
discrimination, developing and conducting information programs to
promote public understanding of the Act and the role and activities of the
Commission.197
When the federal Canadian HRA was passed, a special Human Rights Tribunal
(Tribunal) was also created to have sole jurisdiction over the judicial adjudication of
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human rights violation cases.198 The Tribunal’s mission is “[t]o provide Canadians with
an improved quality of life and an assurance of equal access to the opportunities that exist
in our society through the fair-minded and equitable interpretation and enforcement of the
Canadian Human Rights Act . . .”199 The Tribunal receives its mandate and funding
directly from Parliament and operates as an independent agency separate from the
HRC.200 The Tribunal operates in a similar fashion to a court; however, “as an
administrative tribunal, the [Tribunal] has more flexibility than regular courts. This
allows those who appear before it a chance to tell their cases more fully without having to
follow strict rules of evidence.”201 All cases are referred to the Tribunal through the HRC,
which is the starting point for all human rights violation complaints.202 The HRC may
decide to act as the victim’s attorney (sometimes in a limited capacity) at a case before
the tribunal; otherwise the victim is required to represent himself or herself alone, or be
represented through an independent attorney.203 If one of the parties opposes the outcome
of the case before the Tribunal, an appeal may be made to the Canadian Federal
Courts.204
While the above explanation of the federal Tribunal is helpful in understanding
how human rights tribunals are conducted in Canada, schools are covered under the
provincial human rights codes. 205 Thus, complainants of sexual harassment in
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educational environments in Canada would work through the complaint process within
their province’s human rights code, commission and ultimately tribunal.206 The scope of
this Article does not permit a recitation of how each province’s complaint and resolution
process works, however, the complaint process established by the Ontario Human Rights
Commission will be discussed briefly to give an idea of how a typical school sexual
harassment complaint would be lodged in Canada.
In order to lodge a complaint in Ontario, the complainant first calls a hotline and
speaks with Commission staff to see if the alleged discrimination falls under the Ontario
Code.207 The complainant is then sent a form to complete, along with instructions
regarding completion of that form.208 If the complaint is accepted by the Commission,
after it receives an answer from the respondent, it will attempt to settle the dispute
through mediation with the parties.209 If mediation is unsuccessful, the Commission will
conduct an investigation and enter into a binding Conciliation process with the parties.210
If this proves unsuccessful, the Commission will decide whether to refer the matter to the
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.211 Unlike the federal Commission, the Ontario
Commission is an impartial body, and though it will present evidence from its
investigation before the tribunal, it will not represent either party, though each party is
entitled to his or her own legal counsel.212
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D. The Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law in Canada
In Canada, sexual harassment is similarly legally considered discrimination on the
basis of sex.213 The Supreme Court of Canada established this holding in Janzen v. Platy
Enterprises Ltd.214 In Janzen, the complainants were subjected to constant physical and
verbal sexual abuse while working as waitresses for the defendant; they consequently
terminated their employment after complaints to their supervisor failed to ameliorate the
situation.215 The Supreme Court of Canada decided Janzen not long after the United
States Supreme Court initially determined that sexual harassment is considered sexual
discrimination under Title VII, and thus came to an analogous conclusion under Canadian
human rights law.216
While the Janzen decision represented a positive course for human rights
advocates in Canada, it created confusion in the lower courts regarding the human rights
tribunals’ exclusive jurisdiction over human rights cases.217 The Supreme Court of
Canada clarified the human rights tribunals’ jurisdiction over sexual harassment cases in
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Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria,218
holding that violations of human rights legislation may not be brought as civil actions,
but only under the jurisdiction of human rights tribunals.219 Therefore, in Canada human
rights cases only enter the traditional court system through appeal from a final tribunal
decision.220
Before examining sexual harassment discrimination under Human Rights
Legislation in the context of schools, the Canadian courts first examined school board
liability for discrimination of students based on race in the case of Ross v. New Brunswick
School District No. 15 and Attis.221 In Ross, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
school district has a duty to provide a discrimination-free learning environment and
therefore may be held liable for discriminatory behavior (in this case racial
discrimination) on the part of a school employee.222 In Ross, the Court found that where
the school district had failed to meaningfully discipline a racist teacher, a poisoned
environment had been created that was characterized by a lack of equity and tolerance.223
The Court further stated that “[a] school board has a duty to maintain a positive school
environment for all persons served by it and it must be ever vigilant of anything that
might interfere with this duty.”224 Likewise, the Canadian courts went on to find that a
university could similarly be held liable for the sexual harassment of one of its students
by a professor under the Newfoundland human rights code.225
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Perhaps the most prominent sexual harassment case in Canada presently is North
Vancouver School District No. 44 v. Jubran.226 This case was initially decided by the
British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, but was subsequently appealed to the British
Columbia Court of Appeal.227 As the case involves peer sexual harassment, albeit based
upon sexual orientation, it is being styled by at least one Canadian solicitor as the
Canadian Davis test case for peer sexual harassment.228
In Jubran, the victim filed a complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights
Commission after he was repeatedly harassed, both physically and verbally, because his
peers perceived him as a homosexual.229 At his secondary school, from grade eight to
grade twelve, Jubran was “taunted with homophobic epithets and was physically
assaulted, including being spit upon, kicked and punched by other students.”230 Even
though the school recognized the harassment and disciplined a few of the perpetrators, it
failed to effectively remedy the situation, as the harassment continued throughout
Jubran’s high school career.231
The court, employing a broad interpretation of the British Columbia Human
Rights Code, held that even though Jubran was not a homosexual, harassment that was
homophobic in nature was discriminatory.232 The court ordered that the school district
pay Jubran compensatory damages, in addition to ordering the school district to “cease its
226
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contravention of the Code and refrain from committing the same or similar
contravention.”233
It is important to note that cases brought on a theory of sexual orientation
harassment, such as Jubran, properly belong, and are relevant to a discussion about
gender-based sexual harassment. 234 In fact, the Canadian HRA explicitly provides
protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation.235 Both of these forms of
harassment are rooted in the harassers’ expression of power and control over their victim.
While harassment based on sexual orientation, perceived or not, may not seem like
regular gender-based sexual harassment, it has the same deleterious effects on its
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victims.236 Additionally, it is important to also recognize orientation-based sexual
harassment as inappropriate behavior; it is not just “boys being boys.”237
E. The Benefits of the Placement of Sexual Harassment Discrimination under Human
Rights Legislation in Canada
The Canadian Supreme Court’s holding in Bhadauria squarely placed sexual
harassment cases under the jurisdiction of human rights tribunals rather than the private
civil litigation sphere.238 According to Erika Chamberlain, professor of law at University
of Western Ontario, this categorization has created a tension concerning the proper
jurisdictional home for sexual harassment cases.239 Chamberlain argues that tension is
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created because sexual harassment encompasses elements of both distributive and
corrective justice.240 Chamberlain finds that the “former views sexual harassment as an
issue of sexual equality, properly addressed by the human rights system with its public
process and broad remedial powers.”241 “The latter describes it as a private injury that
should be litigated through the adversarial system and compensated by damages.”242
Ultimately, Chamberlain finds that, while sexual harassment cannot completely fit
neatly into either category, sexual harassment properly belongs under the distributive
theory because, even if it cannot afford victims the same level of compensation as the
private civil tort system, the human rights tribunals have broader remedies available to
them than at common law.243 These remedies, including education and affirmative action
programs, help redress the historical harm that sex stereotypes have caused, and also help
improve the situation of women and those facing sexual orientation discrimination
generally.244
Furthermore, while tribunals have the authority to order compensatory damages
awards, the major focus of tribunal remedies is on the use of broad remedial powers to
remove discriminatory environments and prevent future harm.245 As evidenced in the
Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, a board of inquiry can order “any party who has
contravened this Act to do any act or thing that constitutes full compliance with the Act
and to rectify any injury caused to any person or class of person or make compensation
therefore.”246 For example, in ordering the school to “cease its contravention” of the Act,
240
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the Jubran Tribunal set up a monitoring program with the school and the human rights
commission of British Columbia.247
Additionally, in recognizing the sensitive nature of many discrimination
complaints, human rights tribunals are more flexible and informal in their proceedings
than regular courts.248 The nature of these proceedings assists those bringing sexual
harassment claims in general, and may in particular be of assistance to younger students
bringing a complaint, who may be more intimidated by a full court proceeding.249 In sum,
human rights tribunals have procedures in place that allow them to better handle
discrimination and harassment complaints.
IV. COMPARISON OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS
A. Administrative Enforcement
While the American OCR and the Canadian Commissions perform similar
functions in administratively enforcing anti-sexual harassment discrimination laws in
schools, the Canadian Commissions are organized in a more logical and efficient manner.
While the American system has several different agencies that enforce civil rights
legislation in different contexts,250 the Canadian human rights commissions bring all
discrimination complaints under one umbrella, either in the provincial or the federal
system.251 This system arguably makes it easier for victims of discrimination to know
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where to file a complaint, as there is only one agency involved no matter what the context
of the discrimination. Moreover, whereas the different anti-discrimination agencies of the
Unites States are at the whim of the priorities of the political groups in office, Canadian
commissions, as they are organized into one anti-discrimination enforcement group, may
wield more combined power in achieving their goals.252 This concept is evidenced by the
noticeable disparity in the name recognition value and power wielded between the EEOC
and the OCR, even though each agency was created to combat the same evil, only in
different settings.253
B. Judicial Enforcement
In the United States, students may bring suit to recover damages and injunctive
relief under Title IX for sexual harassment suffered in schools.254 However, many victims
are arguably deterred from filing because either the standard of recovery for damages is
extremely high or the standard of recovery for injunctive relief has not clearly been
articulated.255 Alternatively, in Canada, civil human right suits do not exist as Canadians
address human rights complaints in special human rights tribunals, which are completely
separate system from normal civil litigation.256 Thus, the human rights tribunals, though
impartial, are in a particularly good position to properly adjudicate discrimination
complaints because their sole jurisdiction and experience is in human rights law.257
Furthermore, student sexual harassment complainants may not be as inhibited in
Canada because the standard for recovery against a school board in a tribunal setting is a
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showing that the school board failed to provide an educational environment that was free
from discriminatory harassment.258 If this legal standard is met, both injunctive and
compensatory relief may be granted.259 Also, Canadian complainants do not have to
choose whether to file a civil action or an administrative complaint; the system is
streamlined to funnel all complaints though the Commission for administrative remedy or
resolution at a tribunal. 260 Thus, complainants are not forced to make some kind of
strategic decision regarding how they will proceed with their complaint.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Even though Title IX has had over thirty years to eliminate discrimination on the
basis of sex in America’s schools,261 under the present system in the United States,
students who suffer sexual harassment at school have little recourse if their school has no
sexual harassment grievance policy in place, or if that policy does not work.262 While the
Supreme Court decisions in Gebser and Davis were progressive in that they recognized
that recovery is available in both student-teacher and student-student sexual harassment
situations, the legal standards of recovery established by those cases detract from other
possible remedies that might better effectuate the goals of Title IX.263 Likewise, while the
OCR is in a position to enforce implementation of Title IX sexual harassment
compliance, it has largely failed to do so.264 Thus, sexual harassment continues to exist at
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high levels in American schools because Title IX has been emasculated by poor
administrative and confusing judicial enforcement.265
In fixing this problem, the Unites States should look to the Canadian Human
Rights system of anti-discrimination enforcement. The Unites States should streamline its
system of antidiscrimination agencies to better enable victims to seek help, and also
enable agencies to resolve harm and eliminate discrimination.266 While President George
W. Bush recognized that federal agencies in the business of national security and law
enforcement belong under one organizational umbrella267, an analogous push has never
been made to bring together the agencies that enforce civil rights laws.
The United States legislature and/or courts should also articulate a less rigorous
standard of recovery under Title IX for sexual harassment plaintiffs seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief.268 The present direction of the case law, where focus is almost entirely
placed on seeking compensatory damages, muddies the issue.269 While it is important to
compensate victims, it is arguably more important to hold schools accountable for Title
IX requirements.270 Unfortunately, under the present system, where the spotlight is on
judicially preventing financial liability and therefore protecting the school board purse,
school boards are under little pressure to enact Title IX sexual harassment reporting,
education and grievance policies.271
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In sum, a clearly articulated reasonableness or negligence standard for injunctive
relief against school boards would allow a plaintiff to more easily and quickly force his
or her school into compliance.272 Again, while compensation is important, perhaps it is
more important to provide the plaintiff, and his or her classmates, a harassment-free
environment for learning.273
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